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THE ROCKY ROAD TO LEGAL REFORM:
IMPROVING THE LANGUAGE OF JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
Peter Tiersmat
INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental principles of our justice
system is that the judge decides what the law is and the jury
applies that law to the facts. We all realize that this distinction
is sometimes a fiction, or in any event, an exaggeration. We
know-or at least strongly suspect-that jurors sometimes
ignore the law. Likewise, judges can strongly influence
determinations of fact, most notably by excluding certain
evidence. All of this presupposes that we can neatly
compartmentalize law and facts in the first place.
Nonetheless, most of us would agree that in a system
governed by the rule of law, juries should follow the law that is
enacted by the legislature and construed by the courts, rather
than pursuing their own notions of how a case ought to be
decided or making up the rules as they proceed. Obviously,
jurors can only follow the law if someone explains it to them in
a comprehensible fashion. That brings us to the issue of jury
instructions.
©2001 Peter Tiersma. All Rights Reserved.
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This Article does not discuss the possibility of
nullification, which suggests a principled deviation from the
law. In any event, for a jury to nullify a rule of law, it must
first understand the law. Only then can it determine that its
application in a particular case would be unjust. Hence, even
nullification presupposes comprehension. A jury that acts in
ignorance of the law has not engaged in nullification.
This Article begins with a brief outline of the history
of jury instructions, including recent research on the language
of such instructions and the movement to improve their
comprehensibility. It then surveys the rather mixed reaction of
the courts towards this problem and offers some reasons why
judges are often unreceptive to research on the issue. Next, the
Article describes how the problem is being addressed by the
committees that draft standardized or pattern jury
instructions, drawing mainly on my experience as a member of
such a committee in California, but discussing issues that are
likely to arise in any jurisdiction. Ultimately, the language of
jury instructions, and thus the quality of the decisions made by
juries, will gradually improve, but the process will be neither
easy nor quick.
I. THE HISTORY OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Originally, there was a rule in England that judges
were not supposed to instruct jurors at all; they could only
answer questions.1 Even then, the answers to jury questions
were not always very helpful. In the 1314 case of Abbot of
Tewkesbury v. Calewe, a jury was asked to decide whether
certain land was "free alms" or "lay fee."2 They pointed out to
the judge, "We are not men of law," implicitly requesting his
assistance.3 The judge replied, "Say what you feel." This is the
problem, of course. If a judge does not explain to the jury what
it is supposed to do, the jury will do what it feels is best. This is
' William W. Schwarzer, Communicating With Juries: Problems and
Remedies, 69 CAL. L. REV. 731, 732-37 (1981).
2 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 95 (3d ed.
1990) (citing Abbot of Tewkesbury v. Calewe, (1314) 39 SS 158, 161).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 95 n.40.
1082 [Vol. 66: 4
THE LANGUAGE OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
precisely the sort of arbitrary decision making that the rule of
law seeks to prevent.
Eventually, judges in England did begin to instruct
jurors on the law. But even today, English jury instructions
(part of the judge's "summation") remain oral and relatively
informal. The judge summarizes the facts and possible
inferences to be drawn from them and then tells jurors in his
own words what the relevant law is.
As in England, American judges originally did not
instruct jurors on the law. Jurors were expected to use their
common sense. Common sense may have worked well enough
when the country was largely rural. But as the country
industrialized, legal disputes became more complex and the
need for consistently applied rules of law became more
pressing. Eventually, jurors lost the right to decide questions of
law. Additionally, toward the end of the nineteenth century,
many states took away the power of the judge to charge juries
on the facts. Thus arose the modern division of labor in which
the judge decides the law and the jury is entrusted with the
facts. Inevitably, jurisdictions began to require the judge to
instruct the jury on the relevant law.
The legal profession soon came to realize that
instructing the jury could involve a lot of work and duplication
of effort. With every trial, judges and attorneys would spend
time drafting the instructions. Another problem was that
instructions were often inconsistent from judge to judge. And
judges were often reversed for instructional error.
In 1935, Judge William J. Palmer of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles, California addressed some of these issues
in an article recommending that a committee be formed to
compile approved instructions for civil cases. 5 The presiding
judge of the court was impressed by the idea and appointed a
committee of lawyers and judges to accomplish this goal. The
committee published a book of instructions a few years later.
The descendant of this book of instructions is still used in
California, where it is known as the Book of Approved Jury
Instructions ("BAJI"). A similar book of criminal instructions,
California Jury Instructions: Criminal ("CALJIC") soon
r ROBERT G. NIELAND, PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: A CRITICAL LOOK AT A
MODERN MOVEMENT TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEM 6 (1979).
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followed.6 The venture was a tremendous success and has since
been imitated by many other states.
Tellingly, the name of the original collection of civil
jury instructions in California, and especially the reference to
"approved" jury instructions, lays bare both the strengths and
weaknesses of the approach that was generally taken by the
committee of judges and lawyers in California and in many
other American jurisdictions. The philosophy of much of the
original pattern jury instruction movement was to search for
language to which a court or legislature had given its stamp of
approval. This approved language was found, for the most part,
in judicial opinions and in statutes. The approach had a very
powerful advantage. Copying verbatim the language of
statutes-and, to a somewhat lesser extent, judicial opinions-
was a virtually foolproof method of insulating the instructions
from legal attack on appeal. After the Constitution, legislation
is supreme in our legal system. Who could fault a judge for
reading to the jurors from a statute when the statute, by
definition, is an accurate statement of the law?
Yet there were and are some significant downsides to
copying approved language. Many of the cases and statutes
that contain the rules of law were drafted quite a while ago.
The words in one version of the reasonable doubt instruction,
still used today, were taken verbatim from a Massachusetts
case decided in 1850.8 Moreover, cases and statutes are written
primarily for an audience of lawyers and, thus, have never
been intended to be read and understood by the lay public.
Consequently, using approved language and publishing the
results did save time and probably resulted in fewer reversals
for instructional error. But it did not increase jurors'
understanding of the law. In fact, it may have had the opposite
effect.
Research confirms that jury instructions are hard for
the average juror to understand. The seminal study by Robert
and Veda Charrow analyzed some of California's BAJI (civil)
instructions. The Charrows found that their research subjects
3 The most recent edition is CAL. SUPERIOR COURT (L.A. COUNTY), COMM.
ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL (6th ed.
1996) [hereinafter CALJIC].
See generally NIELAND, supra note 5.
" Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850).
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understood roughly one-half of the instructions. They then
rewrote the instructions in a way that maintained the meaning
but avoided some of the linguistic problems in the originals,
producing better-albeit not perfect-comprehension scores.9 A
substantial number of studies of instructions in other
jurisdictions have produced similar results." The message is
that it is possible to reform the language of jury instructions
and thereby achieve greater comprehension. Jurors may never
fully understand the law, but we can do better.
Assuming that communication with juries can and
should be improved, how do we achieve that goal? The most
common formal mechanisms for changing the law are
legislation and judicial decisions. Although there are statutes
requiring that jurors be instructed on certain matters, and
sometimes even in specified language, for the most part
legislatures have not particularly concerned themselves with
the language of jury instructions. They have little expertise in
the area, and appear content to leave the matter to the legal
profession. This means that reform is most likely to occur
through the courts, or-as discussed below-through the work
of the committees of lawyers and judges who draft the
instructions.
II. THE REACTION OF THE COURTS
For the most part, the courts have not been especially
effective as a mechanism for reforming the language of jury
instructions. One reason is that litigants seldom seem to raise
9 Robert Charrow & Veda Charrow, Making Legal Language
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
1306 (1979).
10 See, e.g., AIIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS
UNDERSTANDABLE (1982); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?,
52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (1989); Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do
Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan
Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401 (1990); Bradley Saxton,
How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using Real Juries and
Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59 (1998); Laurence J. Severance &
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply
Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 153 (1982); David U. Strawn &
Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478
(1976).
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the issue when the instructions are being selected. Perhaps
understandably, lawyers are much more interested in the
question of which instructions are given, and in possibly
slanting those instructions in their favor, than they are in how
the instructions are expressed. Initially, this may seem logical
enough, but on reflection it is somewhat surprising. One would
think that in a fair number of trials one side would have an
interest in jurors following the law, while the other side might
prefer to ignore or minimize the legal rules. The former would
presumably fight for clear instructions, while the latter would
prefer the existing obscurity. As far as I know, however,
lawyers seldom use this strategy, at least as far as jury
instructions are concerned. As a result, lawyers tend not to
object to the language of jury instructions until perhaps raising
it on appeal, after they have lost the case. At this point, of
course, appellate judges are likely to reply that it is too late;
they should have objected at trial.
Even when lawyers are aware of the
comprehensibility issue, many states with pattern or
standardized instructions either require or strongly
recommend that they be used when available.11 Add to this the
suspicion of judges that the instructions offered by the parties
are almost always slanted in some way and it should be
evident that it will be difficult, perhaps impossible, for
individual parties to propose modifying the language of
existing pattern instructions.
Judges also tend to be unhelpful when during
deliberations the jurors ask a question about the meaning of an
instruction. In several jurisdictions it has been held inadequate
to respond to jury questions or confusion by simply referring
back to the instructions that were already given. 2 Nonetheless,
it is all too common for judges to simply reread the original
instructions, or to refer jurors back to them. Unfortunately,
1 Illinois is one example. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Instructing on Death:
Psychologists, Juries and Judges, 49 AM. PSYCHOL. 425 (1993).
12 Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13 (1946); McDowell v.
Calderon, 130 F.3d 833, 838-39 (9th Cir. 1997) (en bane); United States v. Bolden, 514
F.2d 1301, 1308-09 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Petersen, 513 F.2d 1133, 1136
(9th Cir. 1975); Powell v. United States, 347 F.2d 156, 157-58 (9th Cir. 1965); Seattle v.
Gellein, 768 P.2d 470, 471-72 (Wash. 1989); Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d 1252, 1254-
55 (Colo. 1986); Commonwealth v. Smith, 70 A. 850, 850-51 (Pa. 1908).
1086 [Vol. 66: 4
THE LANGUAGE OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
this inadequate practice is frequently upheld on appeal."
Consider the recent New York case of People v. Redd, 4 in which
jurors wrote a note to the judge seeking in vain a "laymen's"
explanation of the concept of reasonable doubt. Although the
appellate court ducked the issue on procedural grounds, it
suggested that the trial court correctly relied on its original
instruction. In fact, it advised lower courts to adhere to the
language of New York's pattern instruction.'5
Consider what would happen if a law school
instructor answered student questions by simply rereading her
notes verbatim. She would quickly be looking for a different
line of work. Yet this is exactly what many judges do.
Unfortunately, there is a rational reason for judges to react so
cautiously: the fear of reversal. It is a rare judge who has been
reversed for responding to questions by repeating an
instruction word for word. Judges who bravely try to explain a
concept in their own words, on the other hand, risk having the
verdict overturned. This is especially true with important-and
conceptually very difficult-standards like reasonable doubt.16
Sometimes there is evidence after trial that a
particular jury was actually confused by an instruction. One
might think that when this happens, courts would realize that
their instructional efforts were inadequate. Yet evidence of
actual confusion has had very little impact because of the rule
that juries are not allowed to impeach their own verdicts. 17 This
13 See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000); Waterford v.
Halloway, 491 N.E.2d 1199, 1207 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); People v. Gonzalez, 77 A.D.2d
654, 654, 430 N.Y.S.2d 655, 655 (2d Dep't 1980) (holding it is not error to reread the
original instructions after the jury came back and asked for additional instructions "in
layman's terms"); Biegler v. Kirby, 574 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Or. 1978).
14 266 A-.D.2d 12, 698 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1st Dep't 1999).
"G Id. at 215.
'G See, e.g., People v. Ruge, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(reversing trial court for trying to explain reasonable doubt in laymen's terms); People
v. Garcia, 126 Cal. Rptr. 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) ('Well intentioned efforts to 'clarify'
and 'explain' [reasonable doubt] criteria have had the result of creating confusion and
uncertainty, and have repeatedly been struck down by the courts of review.").
1 See Wingate v. Lester E. Cox Med. Center, 853 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Mo. 1993)
(stating that an affidavit or testimony of a juror is inadmissible in evidence for the
purpose of impeaching the verdict of a jury); Watson v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp.,
827 P.2d 656, 662 (Idaho 1992) (stating that juror affidavits cannot normally be used to
impeach verdict); Murphy v. County of Lake, 234 P.2d 712, 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951)
("The rule is well established in this state that affidavits or other oral evidence of
either concurring or dissenting jurors which tend to contradict, impeach or defeat their
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procedural barrier means that even when interviews with
jurors show that they did not understand, for example, the
difference between aggravation and mitigation in a death
penalty case, 8 there is no way to present such evidence to a
court.
The rule against a jury impeaching its verdict is
reinforced on appeal by a presumption that jurors understood
their instructions.' 9 In practice, this presumption is nearly
impossible to rebut. As noted, interviews with jurors after the
verdict are generally inadmissible for this purpose. Moreover,
although the questions that juries ask would seem to indicate
uncertainty on that point, appellate courts seem to assume
that rereading the instruction will solve the problem. Hence,
jury questions on the meaning of an instruction, even though
they are strong evidence of confusion, and are often
unanswered, also will not rebut the presumption.
Finally, it would be unrealistic to ignore political
considerations. Because jury instructions are standardized,
judges are very reluctant to declare that a particular
instruction was poorly drafted, especially in criminal cases,
because there might be dozens or hundreds of prisoners in the
jurisdiction who were convicted on the same instruction.
Judges understandably fear opening the floodgates to massive
amounts of litigation. If the case involves the death penalty,
the stakes are even higher, and the political pressure to let
sleeping dogs lie is even more intense.
verdict, are inadmissible.").
'8 See Ursula Bentele, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is Overwhelming;
Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1011
(2001); see also LORELEI SONTAG, DECIDING DEATH, A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
OF PENALTY PHASE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND CAPITAL DECISION-MAKING (1990)
[dissertation: Univ. Microfilms].
'9 See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) ("A jury is
presumed to follow its instructions."); Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979)
(plurality opinion) ("A critical assumption underlying [the] system [of trial by jury] is
that juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial judge."); Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 382 n.10 (1964); Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954);
see also ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 73-74 (1970) ("In the
absence of definitive studies to the contrary, we must assume that juries for the most
part understand and faithfully follow instructions.").
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THE LANGUAGE OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
These various barriers to reform are illustrated by
some interesting cases decided during the past decade. One of
these cases is United States ex rel. Free v. Peters." James Free
was convicted of murder, sentenced to death, and had his
sentence upheld by the Illinois state courts.2 Free later
petitioned the federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus,
claiming that even if the statutory scheme under which he was
condemned was constitutional (as previous decisions had held),
the jury had not properly understood that scheme as expressed
in its death penalty instructions.22 In other words, Free was
claiming that the rule of law had something to say about the
procedure under which the jury had decided his fate but that
the instructions had failed to effectively communicate the rules
to the jurors.
Free supported his contention with research by the
late Professor Hans Zeisel, who had conducted a survey of how
Illinois' pattern instructions on the death penalty were
understood by people called to jury service in Cook County,
Illinois. After receiving a report from a magistrate, who had
held extensive hearings on the Zeisel study,23 District Court
Judge Marvin Aspen determined that Zeisel's results were
scientifically valid.24
Although the Zeisel study investigated juror
comprehension of several points of law, its most dramatic
finding regarded what are called nonstatutory mitigating
factors. A capital jury has the right to consider any type of
mitigating evidence in reaching its decision.' The Illinois
instructions presented jurors with a list of some illustrations of
mitigating factors. Not surprisingly, large numbers of jurors
20 806 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
21 People v. Free, 447 N.E.2d 218 (Ill. 1983); People v. Free, 492 N.E.2d 1269
(Ill. 1986); People v. Free, 522 N.E.2d 1184 (Ill. 1988).
22 Free challenged the Illinois death penalty scheme on several grounds, three
of them relevant here: (1) that the statute and jury instructions imposed a presumption
in favor of death; (2) that the statute failed to narrowly channel and guide the jury's
discretion, creating the risk that the death penalty would be arbitrarily or capriciously
imposed; and (3) that the Illinois sentencing scheme failed to assign a specific standard
of proof. United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 778 F. Supp. 431, 434-36 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(referring the matter to a magistrate for evidentiary hearings).
'3 See United States ex rel. Free v. McGinnis, 818 F. Supp. 1098, 1104 (N.D.
Ill. 1992).
24 Peters, 806 F. Supp. at 713-19.
"5 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
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believed that for them to consider mitigation offered by the
defendant, it should be similar to the items on the list. In fact,
however, jurors are free to consider anything at all to be a
mitigating factor, whether or not it was on the list or similar to
a listed item. The court, referring to this "overwhelming
empirical evidence,"26 held that it was reasonably likely that
Free's jury misapprehended this important point.2 ' Based on
this and similar evidence, Judge Aspen issued a writ of habeas
corpus, although he stayed the order pending appeal.28
The ink had barely dried on Judge Aspen's order
when another inmate on Illinois' death row, the notorious
serial killer John Wayne Gacy, tried to ride on Free's coattails.
He likewise petitioned the federal courts for habeas relief,
noting that his jury had been instructed in essentially the
same language as had Free's. The district court rejected his
petition.2 ' Because of some procedural maneuvering in the Free
case, Gacy's appeal reached the Seventh Circuit first." In an
opinion written by Judge Easterbrook, the panel gave little
credit to Professor Zeisel's study, arguing that the problem
might not have been poor drafting, but the inherent complexity
of the concepts contained in the instructions. Perhaps jurors
are "simply unable to grasp thoughts unfamiliar to them. '
The panel also appealed to tradition: "[A]s long as the United
States has been a nation, judges have been using legalese in
instructing juries."32
In this context it is highly ironic that the federal
courts have probably had the most success in improving
communication with juries.33 The Federal Judicial Center has
published a report in which Judge Marshall noted-in contrast
to the Seventh Circuit-that "Itihe principal barrier to effective
26 Peters, 806 F. Supp. at 726.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 732. For further details on the Free v. Peters case, see Peter M.
Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand Mitigation?, 1995
UTAH L. REV. 1.
29 United States ex rel. Gacy v. Welborn, 1992 WL 211018 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26,
1992).
", Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1993).
31 Id. at 311.
32 Id.
See, e.g., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NINTH
CIRcUIT (1992).
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communication is probably not the inherent complexity of the
subject matter, but our inability to put ourselves in the
position of those not legally trained."34
The Gacy panel also invoked the presumption that
jurors understand their instructions:
Instead of inquiring what juries actually understood, and how they
really reasoned, courts invoke a "presumption" that jurors
understand and follow their instructions.... [T]his is not a bursting
bubble, applicable only in the absence of better evidence. It is a rule
of law--a description of the premises underlying the jury system,
rather than a proposition about jurors' abilities and states of mind."*
Particularly striking is the court's suggestion that this
presumption cannot be overcome by any empirical evidence.
When Free's appeal finally came before a different
panel of Seventh Circuit judges, the outcome was virtually
preordained. 6 The opinion, authored by Judge Richard Posner,
did acknowledge-at least, implicitly-that empirical evidence
might be able to rebut the presumption that jurors understand
their instructions.37 But it imposed almost impossibly high
standards on such proof.3 First, Posner rejected the results of
the Zeisel study because it did not test a control group with
revised instructions.39 As a result, Free did not prove that it
was the language of his instructions, rather than some other
factor, that caused the test subjects' low comprehension
scores." Significantly, a subsequent study by Shari Seidman
Diamond and Judith N. Levi has demonstrated that revised
instructions do indeed lead to higher comprehension than the
original Free instructions."
Judge Posner's second criticism in Free was that the
subjects in the study answered written questions based on a
supposedly hypothetical case presented by means of a written
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (1988).
Gacy, 994 F.2d at 313 (citations omitted).
Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 513 U.S. 967 (1994).
Id. at 706.
3s Id.
" Id. at 705.
40 Id. at 706.
41 Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death
by Revising and Testing Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224 (1996).
2001] 1091
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record.42 In a real case, their comprehension would have
benefited from hearing the evidence and arguments of
counsel.43 But remember that actual evidence of confusion,
based on real cases, is barred by the rule that prevents jurors
from impeaching their own verdicts. As the appellate court
observed in Gacy :
One enduring element of the jury system, no less vital today than
two centuries ago, is insulation from questions about how juries
actually decide. Jurors who volunteered that they did not
understand their instructions would not be permitted to address the
court, and a defendant could not upset a verdict against him even if
all of the jurors signed affidavits describing chaotic and uninformed
deliberations.
44
Taken together, the Free and Gacy cases raise an almost
insurmountable barrier to challenging the comprehensibility of
jury instructions in cases of this sort, at least in the Seventh
Circuit. Survey research showing that mock jurors did not
understand an instruction is invalid because the test subjects
were not real jurors. But evidence of actual confusion by real
jurors is inadmissible. Even if we managed to surmount these
barriers, the presumption that jurors understand their
instructions could always be pulled out of the hat.
Although Free and Gacy never made it to the United
States Supreme Court, another set of related cases did. In
Buchanan v. Angelone," the defendant was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death for killing his father, stepmother, and
two brothers. There was evidence that he was mentally
disturbed, largely because of the death of his mother; this is
important, of course, because it constitutes mitigation.46
During the penalty phase of his trial, the jury was
given Virginia's pattern capital sentencing instruction:
You have convicted the Defendant of an offense which may
be punishable by death. You must decide whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment.
42 Free, 12 F.3d at 705.
43 Id. at 705-06.
44 Gacy, 994 F.2d at 313 (citations omitted).
45 522 U.S. 269 (1998).
41 Id. at 271.
1092 [Vol. 66: 4
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Before the penalty can be fixed at death, the
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his
conduct in committing the murders of [his family] was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the above four victims, or
to any one of them.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the requirements of the preceding
paragraph, then you may fix the punishment of the Defendant at
death, or if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty
is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the Defendant
at life imprisonment.
If the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the requirements of the second paragraph in this
instruction, then you shall fix the punishment of the Defendant at
life imprisonment.47
Buchanan's counsel did not object to this instruction at trial.4
8
After being sentenced to death, Buchanan's appeals to
the Virginia courts were rejected and he applied for a federal
writ of habeas corpus.49 When his case reached the United
States Supreme Court, he argued that the instruction had
violated his constitutional right to have the jury properly
instructed on the role of mitigating evidence."0 Observe that the
instruction nowhere mentions the role of mitigation."
Moreover, it suggests to jurors that as long as they find that
one or more of the aggravating factors (that the murder was
vile, etc.) was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury
should fix the penalty at death.52 Of course, the instruction
continues that the jury should vote for life imprisonment if it
decides that the death penalty is "not justified."53 But how was
the jury to decide whether the death penalty was "justified"?
They might well think that death was justified if the
government proved one of the aggravators beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that it was not justified if the government failed to
do so.
Id. at 272 n.1.
48 Id. at 273.
49 Id. at 274.
'0 Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 275.
81 Id. at 272 n.1.
52 Id.
' Id.
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Nonetheless, in a majority opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the
instruction discouraged the jury from considering all
mitigating evidence:
The instruction informed the jurors that if they found the
aggravating factor proved beyond a reasonable doubt then they "may
fix" the penalty at death, but directed that if they believed that all
the evidence justified a lesser sentence then they "shall" impose a
life sentence. The jury was thus allowed to impose a life sentence
even if it found the aggravating factor proved ....
The Court thus reasoned that the jury would have paid close
attention to the difference between "may" and "shall." It is
worth emphasizing that these jurors were not lawyers. In any
event, even lawyers often disagree on the meaning of "may"
and "shall."55
The Court also relied on the fact that during the
penalty phase there were two days of testimony about
Buchanan's background and mental problems. "It is not likely
that the jury would disregard this extensive testimony in
making its decision, particularly given the instruction to
consider 'all the evidence.' ,56 Yet jurors are routinely told to
ignore relevant evidence, and repeatedly instructed to avoid
feelings of bias or sympathy and to base their decisions solely
on evidence that has been properly admitted. They might well
have believed that the evidence of Buchanan's background and
mental state was legally irrelevant, or that it was relevant only
in deciding whether the proposed aggravating circumstances
were true. Mere mention of the defendant's background or
character would not inform jurors that after concluding that
one or more of the aggravating factors was true, they should
then consider the evidence in mitigation. Only after completing
both steps could they have properly decided whether to impose
the death penalty or life imprisonment.
Id. at 277.
" See BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 939 (2d ed.
1995) ("[C]ourts in virtually every English-speaking jurisdiction have held ... that
shall means may in some contexts, and vice-versa.").
"G Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 278-79.
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The majority also noted that both defense counsel and
the prosecutor discussed the mitigating evidence and its
relevance to sentencing." Yet jurors are almost always warned
that argument of counsel is not evidence and that only the
judge can instruct them on the law.5" They might well have
ignored argument on this point if they believed that it
conflicted with the judge's charge.
Three justices-Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg-
dissented. They agreed that a lawyer trained in death penalty
law would understand the instruction to require the jury to
engage in a second step that considers mitigation, as suggested
by the majority. But to the average juror:
[The instruction] seems to say that, if the jury finds the State has
proved aggravating circumstances that make the defendant eligible
for the death penalty, the jury may "fix the punishment . . . at
death," but if the jury finds that the State has not proved
aggravating circumstances that make the defendant eligible for the
death penalty, then the jury must "fix the punishment . . . at life
imprisonment." To say this without more-and there was no more-
is to tell the jury that evidence of mitigating circumstances
(concerning, say, the defendant's childhood and his troubled
relationships with the victims) is not relevant to their sentencing
decision. 9
Because the instruction did not properly apprise jurors of the
role of mitigation, the dissenters concluded that Buchanan's
death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.0
Much of the problem derives from the fact that we can
never be sure how jurors understood an instruction. Remember
that jurors cannot impeach their own verdict. Lawyers cannot
quiz jurors about their understanding of the law and use the
responses to overturn the verdict. That rule makes sense for a
system concerned with avoiding endless litigation. But it
means that in the average case there is no way of determining
whether the jury understood and followed the law.
U Id. at 278.
5s See, e.g., NINTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL
1.03 (1995); CALJIC, supra note 6, at 0.50.
Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 281-82.
Id. at 285-86.
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Buchanan was not the average case, however. It was
followed by another case presenting almost exactly the same
issue, from the same state, and concerning the same jury
instructions. In Weeks v. Angelone,6 ' the defendant, Lonnie
Weeks, shot a policeman who had stopped the car in which he
was riding. He was tried in Virginia and convicted of capital
murder." During the penalty phase of the trial, the jury
received essentially the same instruction as in the Buchanan
case, and like the jury in Buchanan, it returned a verdict of
death.63 There was one critical difference, however. During its
deliberations, the jury sent the judge this question:
If we believe that Lonnie Weeks, Jr. is guilty of at least 1 of the
alternatives, then is it our duty as a jury to issue the death penalty?
Or must we decide (even though he is guilty of one of the
alternatives) whether or not to issue the death penalty, or one of the
life sentences? What is the Rule? Please clarify?4
It could not be more obvious that at least some of the
jurors interpreted the Virginia instruction in exactly the way
that the dissent in Buchanan suggested they might: as
requiring them to return a death verdict if they decided that at
least one of the aggravating circumstances (the "alternatives"
to which the note referred) was true. To be more blunt, the
question shows that the Buchanan majority was wrong. The
Virginia instruction does not adequately instruct jurors on the
role that mitigation plays in their decision. Unfortunately,
despite this appeal for clarification, the judge refused to
explain the law.65 Rather, he sent the jury a message referring
them back to the original instruction.66
The Weeks case is thus a further illustration of why
we cannot expect trial judges to solve the problem of
incomprehensible jury instructions. When the instructions are
first drafted or selected, judges either cannot or prefer not to
deviate from the language of the standardized or pattern
instructions available in their jurisdiction. If the jury during
G1 120 S. Ct. 727 (2000).
62 Id. at 729-31.
' Id. at 730-31.
64 Id. at 730 (citations omitted).
6Z Id.
r Weeks, 120 S. Ct. at 730.
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deliberations asks a question that requests clarification or
reveals that they do not properly understand a point of law,
most judges fear that they will be penalized by a reversal if
they try to explain a concept in ordinary English. 7
As indicated by the Supreme Court's opinion in
Weeks, we also cannot expect appellate judges to solve the
problem. It seems likely that the dissenters in Buchanan
successfully argued for a grant of certiorari in Weeks because
they believed that they now had the evidence they needed to
prove that the jury did not properly understand the Virginia
death penalty instructions. Not only did the jury come back
with a question seeking clarification on the exact point raised
in Buchanan, but there was evidence that they were very
conflicted by their decision." Specifically, the court reporter
noted in the transcript that as the jurors were polled, "a
majority of the jury members [were] in tears."69 No doubt,
condemning someone to death is a wrenching decision, but it is
even more agonizing if jurors believe that there are reasons to
spare the defendant's life, but that they are legally prevented
from considering them.7 °
The majority in Weeks downplayed this evidence of
confusion and instead fell back on its earlier decision in the
Buchanan case. It invoked the weary but still useful
proposition of law that "[a] jury is presumed to follow its
instructions."71 Moreover, "a jury is presumed to understand a
judge's answer to its question."72 As long as courts trot out such
presumptions whenever there is genuine doubt that a jury
understood the law, instructions are unlikely to improve in any
meaningful way.
r7 See sources cited supra note 16.
Weeks, 120 S. Ct. at 740.
Id. (citations omitted).
70 Although it probably came too late for consideration by the Supreme Court,
research has confirmed that approximately forty percent of mock jurors confronted
with the instruction used in the Weeks case believed that if an aggravating factor is
proven, the instruction requires them to impose the death penalty. Stephen P. Garvey
et al., Correcting Deadly Confusion: Responding to Jury Inquiries in Capital Cases, 85
CORNELLL. REV. 627, 635-36 (2000).
71 Weeks, 120 S. Ct. at 733.
72 Id.
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Responding to Justice Stevens' comment in dissent
that it is virtually certain that the jury misunderstood the
instruction, the majority pointed out that its interpretation of
the instruction was supported not only by the trial judge, but
also by seven justices of the Supreme Court of Virginia, a
federal district judge, and three judges of the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.73 This points to another reason why
reform of the language of jury instructions has so far not been
advanced to any great degree by the appellate process. Judges
as well as lawyers tend to be poor evaluators of whether and
how the ordinary lay public understands legalese. Because
such language is so familiar to them, all too many members of
the legal profession do not fully grasp how difficult it can be for
people with no legal training.
As a further justification for its holding, the Supreme
Court mentioned that Weeks' counsel did not make much of
this matter at trial or on appeal, but treated it largely as an
"afterthought."74 Here we see an illustration of another barrier
to reform: the fact that trial lawyers have until now seldom
considered the need for more comprehensible instructions. As a
result, they often fail to properly preserve the issue at the trial
court level, or fail to raise it in any significant way on appeal.
Finally, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that death
penalty politics has a subtle hand in many of these decisions.
The major cases on the comprehensibility of jury instructions-
Free, Gacy, Buchanan, and Weeks-all involved defendants
who were sentenced to death. This is, perhaps, not surprising
in light of what is at stake. Unfortunately, the importance of
the issue and its high visibility serve only to hinder reform.
Invalidating a death sentence attracts the attention of the
press and is seldom welcomed by the public. If an instruction
was widely used, such a holding has the potential to throw
open the doors of death row in a much more dramatic fashion.
Most judges are understandably very reluctant to engage in
such a politically unpopular measure.
Given these obstacles, widespread reform of the
language of jury instructions will probably not come through
court decisions, at least not in the near future. As mentioned
Id. at 734 n.5.
4 Id. at 734.
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previously, legislators have also shown little inclination to
address this issue. The most likely remaining possibility for
reform is through the committees or commissions that draft
the instructions.
III. JURY INSTRUCTION COMMITTEES
Most jurisdictions that routinely use pattern or
standardized jury instructions have committees of judges and
lawyers who issue them. We have already noted that California
has two such committees, one for civil instructions (the "BAJI
committee") and the other for criminal (the "CALJIC
committee"). The California committees are unusual in that
they have no official statewide status. Members are appointed
by the presiding judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court. The
instructions issued by the BAJI and CALJIC committees have
become highly regarded for legal accuracy and are routinely
used throughout the state.
At the same time, we have seen that jurors do not
understand California's jury instructions all that well. There
is, of course, always some tension between legal accuracy and
comprehension. Yet the CALJIC and BAJI committees have
consistently favored legal accuracy over comprehension.
Consequently, despite occasional hints from the appellate
courts,7" little progress was made in increasing jurors'
understanding of the law, at least in California.
That situation began to change in the aftermath of
the celebrated murder case against O.J. Simpson. A Los
Angeles jury acquitted Simpson despite a belief by many
people that he should have been found guilty of the murder of
his former wife, Nicole Brown. The perception that the criminal
justice system, and particularly the jury, was not working all
that well motivated the Judicial Council of California to
establish a blue ribbon commission to review the jury system.
This commission made its report in 1996. One of its
recommendations related to jury instructions:
7G See, e.g., Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991); Maupin v. Widling,
237 Cal. Rptr. 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that fortunately the Charrow &
Charrow study (supra note 9) did not apply to appellate opinions).
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The Judicial Council should appoint a Task Force on Jury
Instructions to be charged with the responsibility of drafting jury
instructions that accurately state the law using language that will
be understandable to jurors. Proposed instructions should be
submitted to the Judicial Council and the California Supreme Court
for approval. The membership of the Task Force on Jury
Instructions should be diverse, including judges, lawyers,
representatives from the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions
of the Superior Court of Los Angeles, linguists, communications
experts, and other non-lawyers. The Task Force should be charged
with comyleting its work no later than 18 months after its
formation.
Pursuant to this recommendation, the Judicial
Council did indeed set up a task force.7 Its members are
mainly judges and lawyers, although it also includes two
members of the public. The task force was split into two
subcommittees, civil and criminal. I have been a member of the
criminal subcommittee since its inception.
The original plan was that the task force would revise
the existing BAJI and CALJIC instructions. Each
subcommittee of the task force included two or three members
of the BAJI and CALJIC committees. It soon became evident,
however, that the BAJI and CALJIC committees had no
intention of simply fading out of existence. The committees had
a lot of pride in what they had accomplished in the past and
were apparently convinced that the mission of the task force-
to create more comprehensible instructions that accurately
convey the law-was doomed to failure. Of greater practical
importance was that the BAJI and CALJIC instructions are
copyrighted. It is also worth noting that the Los Angeles
Superior Court receives royalties from their publication."8
For much of the first half of 1997, there were
discussions between the Judicial Council and the Los Angeles
Superior Court about how to proceed. Efforts to reach a
compromise failed. Consequently, the BAJI and CALJIC
committees continue their work as usual. The Judicial Council
7 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA ET AL., REPORT OF THE BLUE RIBBON
COMMISSION ON JURY SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT, (Recommendation 5.8, 1996), reprinted
in J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System
Improvement, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1433 (1996).
77 Judicial Council of California, Task Force on Jury Instructions.
7" Caitlin Liu, Say What, Your Honor?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2000, at Al.
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task force has also begun to draft new and more
comprehensible jury instructions, although it has had to start
from scratch because of the copyright issue. It is quite possible
that not too far in the future, California judges and lawyers
will have two sets of jury instructions available to them.
Unless the legislature steps in, or the courts exhibit a strong
preference for one set of instructions over the other, we may
have to let the marketplace decide which will prevail.
In mid 2000 the criminal task force released new jury
instructions for public comment. The remainder of this Article
will compare some of the old and new instructions. It will also
discuss some of the issues that have arisen in the process and
how we have dealt with them. My hope is that reading about
our experience will prove useful to similar groups in other
jurisdictions. Obviously, my comments derive from my own
somewhat biased observations and in no way reflect the
opinions of other members of the task force. Finally, readers
should recall that all discussion of proposed instructions is
simply to illustrate points being made in this Article. The
instructions could still undergo major modifications on the
basis of public comment or for other reasons, and there is at
this time no guarantee that some or all of them will be
accepted by the Judicial Council for use in the courts.
IV. TECHNICAL VOCABULARY
One of the most obvious problems with jury
instructions, or any other legal language that is meant to be
understood by the general public, is technical vocabulary. Some
legal terms are completely unknown in ordinary language, like
quash or expunge or res gestae. Others, which I have elsewhere
called legal homonyms, 9 are ordinary words but have a specific
legal meaning. Examples include brief, burglary, mayhem,
complaint, notice, aggravation, and many others. Legal
homonyms are potentially dangerous because a layperson may
think that he knows what they mean, whereas the terms may
79 PETER TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 111 (1999).
2001] 1101
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
mean something quite different in the law. The average person,
for instance, uses briefs to refer to a type of men's
undergarment, not legal documents.
The first difficulty is categorizing words as ordinary
language or technical terminology. Unfortunately, judges
sometimes assume that words are part of ordinary speech
when in fact they are technical terms with a legal meaning
unknown to the lay public. Thus, although most jurisdictions
provide jurors with some kind of definition of the term
reasonable doubt, at least two federal circuits have held that
this is an ordinary phrase that need not be defined.0 Likewise,
some courts have held that the terms aggravation and
mitigation, which are critical to death penalty decisions, are
ordinary words and that the jury need not be instructed on
their meanings.8 ' The reality is that jurors have a great deal of
difficulty with both of these concepts, making it essential to
provide an understandable definition."
Once it is decided that a term is not part of ordinary
language, it becomes necessary to choose between two
alternatives. One approach is to avoid the word entirely. This
is what our committee decided to do with preponderance of the
evidence. Instead of instructing the jurors that they need to
decide some issue by a preponderance of the evidence, we
propose informing them to decide whether it is more likely than
not."
Elsewhere, we use a more ordinary equivalent for a
technical term, but nonetheless refer to it because we believe
that jurors will be familiar with it and may have
"' See, e.g., United States v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42 (4th Cir. 1994) (disfavoring
attempts to define "reasonable doubt" in the Fourth Circuit); United States v.
Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1993) ("We have reiterated time and again our
admonition that district courts should not attempt to define reasonable doubt.").
8' Cape v. State, 272 S.E.2d 487, 493 (Ga. 1980) (" '[m]itigation' is a word of
common meaning and usage") (citation omitted); accord Smith v. State, 290 S.E.2d 43,
45 (Ga. 1982); see also People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 657 (Cal. 1989) ("aggravate" and
"mitigate" are ordinary words that do not have to be defined for the jury); Pruett v.
State, 697 S.W.2d 872, 876 (Ark. 1985) ("The language used by the legislature in
naming the elements of mitigation cannot be said to be vague and beyond the common
understanding and experience of the ordinary juror.") (citation omitted).
See Tiersma, supra note 28.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, TASK FORCE ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 615 (circulated for public comment, May 2000) (on file
with author) [hereinafter TASK FORCE INSTRUCTIONS].
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misconceptions about the term if it is not mentioned. The best
example is circumstantial evidence. Our instruction on this
topic distinguishes between direct and indirect evidence, but
we still found it advisable to mention that indirect evidence is
the same as circumstantial evidence. s' The reason, of course, is
the popular notion that circumstantial evidence is somehow
inferior to other evidence or even suspect.
The other approach is to use a technical term, usually
because there is no ordinary word that is close enough in
meaning. If so, the word or phrase must be defined. Thus, we
use the term false token in an instruction regarding a type of
theft, defining it as "a document or object that is not authentic,
but appears to be, and is used to deceive." ' s
An example of how these two approaches interact is
malice aforethought. California's existing instructions use this
term and then define it as involving either express malice or
implied malice:
"Malice" may be either express or implied.
[Malice is express when there is manifested an intention unlawfully
to kill a human being.]
[Malice is implied when:
1. The killing resulted from an intentional act,
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to
human life, and
3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the
danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life.]8
6
Although the difference between express and implied
malice may occasionally be relevant from a legal standpoint,
one wonders whether it is essential to burden the jury with
this terminological nicety.
Our task force also decided to use the term malice
aforethought in our proposed new instruction entitled "Murder
with Malice Aforethought."87 Nonetheless, we avoided using the
terms implied malice and express malice; rather, these concepts
are described without using the words themselves:
Id. at 300.
s Id. at 1308.
CALJIC, supra note 6, at 8.11 (further definitions omitted).
87 TASK FORCE INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 83, at 720.
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The defendant is charged [in Count __] with (first degree/second
degree) murder. You may find the defendant guilty of murder only if
the prosecutor has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. The defendant caused the death of another person [or
fetus]. [AND]
2. (He/She) caused the death by an act committed with
malice aforethought [AND
3. The killing was committed without excuse or
justification.]
The defendant acted with malice aforethought if either:
A. (He/She) intended to kill [that is, acted with express
malice]. OR
B. (He/She) intentionally did an act that (he/she) knew
was highly dangerous to human life and acted with
conscious disregard of that danger [that is, acted with
implied malice]. -8
One possible reason for using an archaic-sounding
legal term like malice aforethought is that jurors may expect to
hear it in a murder case and may wonder about it if they do
not, as in the case of circumstantial evidence. In addition, a
technical term expresses in a word or phrase what would
otherwise require a sentence or two to explain. Lawyers may
appreciate being able to use this shorthand during oral
argument.
Using a term like malice aforethought has the
additional advantage of creating an elegant and relatively
simple list of elements of the crime:
1. the defendant killed someone;
2. he acted with malice aforethought; and
3. he had no justification or excuse.
Unfortunately, that superficial elegance can be
misleading. Jurors cannot mentally process the second element
because it contains a term they do not properly understand.
Deciding whether the defendant acted with malice
aforethought requires understanding the two-part legal
meaning of that term. Only after all of the elements have been
read do they finally get a definition of that phrase, allowing
Id. The definitions of malice and causation are omitted. Notice that we did
leave judges the option of adding a clause that identifies express and implied malice, if
they believe it relevant.
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them to understand what the second element means. Although
it is undoubtedly less elegant, I believe that when possible,
definitions should be incorporated into the elements, as in my
revised version of the murder instruction (elements only)
below:
1. The defendant caused the death of another person [or
fetus]. AND
2A. (He/She) intended to kill
OR
2B. (He/She) intentionally did an act that (he/she) knew
was highly dangerous to human life and acted with
conscious disregard of that danger.
This approach allows jurors to go through the list of
elements with sufficient information to decide whether each
has been met before proceeding to the next element. It reduces
the need to page through the instructions looking for
definitions. Anyone who has tried to read something in archaic
English or a foreign language realizes how frustrating this can
be. Of course, if it is necessary to use a technical term
repeatedly, a separate definition is the only feasible option.
The point is simply that when a word is used once and needs to
be defined, it is generally preferable to define it immediately,
rather than at some later point.
A further advantage of this approach is that we might
be able to avoid mentioning the technical term altogether.
Especially in the case of malice aforethought this strikes me as
preferable because the sum of the individual words does not
equal the whole, conceivably causing a great deal of confusion.
Malice suggests ill will, and aforethought strongly implies
deliberating or engaging in some other mental activity
beforehand. To the lay jury member, it would therefore suggest
that the defendant bore ill will towards the victim before
killing him. Obviously, this is quite different from the legal
meaning.
A final problem with definitions of legal terms is that
all too often they are themselves written in inscrutable legalese
or in formal or archaic language. Among the worst offenders
are definitions of aggravation and mitigation, both of which are
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critical in death penalty jurisprudence. 9 California's existing
definition of mitigation, for instance, is the following: "A
mitigating circumstance is any fact, condition or event which
does not constitute a justification or excuse for the crime in
question, but may be considered as an extenuating
circumstance in determining the appropriateness of the death
penalty."" Yet if people do not know what mitigate means, how
likely are they to be familiar with extenuate? One of the basic
principles of lexicography is that the language of the definition
should be more understandable than the word being defined
and that in any event a word should never be defined by means
of an equally unusual word. California's definition of
mitigation clearly violates that principle.
Negative definitions are also potentially problematic.
Notice that this definition begins by declaring what mitigation
does not include: facts, conditions, or events that constitute an
excuse or justification for the crime. It is true, of course, that
mitigation is different from an excuse or justification; this is
probably the point that the original drafters were trying to
make. But to tell jurors during the penalty phase that
mitigation does not include excuses or justifications is
absolutely and totally wrong. Clearly, the jury would be
entitled to consider anything that the defendant offered as an
excuse or justification. It is mind-boggling that such a
misleading statement could continually be read to penalty
phase jurors.
I am cautiously optimistic that our task force will be
able to clarify the meaning of mitigation. Many of our
definitions are distinctly more comprehensible than those
contained in existing instructions. Yet even in our proposed
plainer language alternatives, the definitions are not always as
plain as they could be. For example, the proposed instructions
use the term aiding and abetting. A defendant is said to have
aided and abetted the perpetrator of a crime if she aided,
facilitated, promoted, encouraged, or instigated the commission
of the crime." This turns out to be virtually identical to the
existing definition in CALJIC 3.01. The reason, not
" See TIERSMA, supra note 79.
CALJIC, supra note 6, at 8.88.
91 TASK FORCE INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 83, at 501.
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surprisingly, is that both definitions come from the same
judicial opinion.92 In my view, a definition of aiding and
abetting as encouraging or helping the perpetrator to commit
the crime seems to cover all of the bases. Yet it can be very
difficult to convince the judges on the committee-even a
committee, like ours, that is devoted to crafting more
understandable instructions-that they should not track the
language of a statute or judicial opinion, as we will see in
greater detail below.
V. FORMAL, UNUSUAL, AND DIFFICULT VOCABULARY
Another fundamental principle of plain English is
that you should use ordinary words in their ordinary meaning.
Existing jury instructions routinely violate this principle.
One reason that judges prefer formal or educated
language is that we tend to evaluate people by how they speak.
This may be most evident with accents. Using regional
pronunciations of words, rather than what has come to be
considered standard American pronunciation, tends to mark or
even stigmatize the speaker as being less educated and of
lower socio-economic status. Linguist William Labov conducted
a famous experiment in New York City, in which he
investigated the "dropping" of the r in phrases like fourth
floor.93 He found that the phenomenon of not pronouncing an
orthographic r before a consonant (fourth, girl) or at the end of
a word (floor, bar) was much more common among lower class
speakers.94 In other words, the degree to which people
pronounce the r can operate as a marker of class in New York.
People v. Beeman, 674 P.2d 1318, 1326 (1984) ("We suggest that an
appropriate instruction should inform the jury that a person aids and abets the
commission of a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the perpetrator, and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or
facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes,
encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.").
' William Labov, The Social Stratification of (r) in New York City
Department Stores, in SOCIOLINGUISTIC PAMRNS 44 (1972).
94 Id. at 63-64.
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Higher status people usually pronounce the r that is
represented in our spelling system, while lower class people
tend not to pronounce an r when it occurs in these positions.95
Using standard English grammar, instead of regional
or dialectal forms, serves the same function. Consider the use
of ain't, which is common in nonstandard English but highly
stigmatized in more formal varieties. This principle also
applies to vocabulary. People who express themselves through
what we might call more "elevated" vocabulary are perceived
as being more educated and of higher social status.
Instructing the jury is one of the few occasions in
which the judge says more than a few words during the typical
Anglo-American trial. Because of the seriousness of the
occasion, judges almost always speak standard English. Many,
in my experience, prefer to speak not just standard English,
but relatively formally. They would rather enumerate than list
several factors for a jury to consider. Events tend to commence
or initiate instead of merely beginning.
It is quite understandable that judges would like to
appear educated and intelligent. Most of us share that
sentiment. The problem is that if we adopt too formal or
educated a speech style, it becomes harder for the average
juror to follow. For example, California's jury instructions
warns jurors that innocent misrecollection is not uncommon.96
It is a wonderfully compact phrase, but I seriously doubt that
the average person will comprehend its meaning, especially as
a very small part of a much longer set of instructions. At the
same time, I do not advocate explaining the law in slang or
street language. Most people in this country have at least a
high school education and would resent having a judge "talk
down" to them. It should normally be possible to write
instructions in a style that is sufficiently dignified without
sacrificing too much comprehension.
Closely related to formal and educated language is a
general preference to speak impersonally. Many judges resist
referring to what they want or would like or need. They prefer
to say I remind you in place of I would like to remind you.
Although such impersonal language may not be a serious
9 Id. at 43
CALJIC, supra note 6, at 2.21.1.
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impediment to understanding, it is worth mentioning that it
does affect the atmosphere in the courtroom. Phrasing requests
or commands in terms of what I would like and similar
constructions is generally perceived as being more polite than
blunt commands. Polite language conveys respect and suggests
to jurors that they and the judge are engaged in a cooperative
venture. Impersonal language, on the other hand, creates
distance. Logically, jurors will be more satisfied with their
experience if we emphasize that they are an important part of
our justice system, rather than merely being people who are
commanded to appear and follow the judge's instructions. To
this end, an occasional politeness marker like please, I would
like to remind you, or thank you is not out of place.
The problem of an overly formal, antiquated, or
elevated style is more difficult to solve when the language
derives from a statute or an important court decision. As
mentioned above, the definition of aiding and abetting came
from a judicial decision. Even more problematic is statutory
language. Many judges are extremely hesitant to deviate from
important statutory language. Thus, the California Penal Code
states that an accessory to a crime is someone who harbors,
conceals, or aids a principal in a felony.97 Our task force
considered an instruction defining an accessory as someone
who helps or hides the perpetrator of a crime. Hide seems
indistinguishable from conceal, and help for all practical
purposes means exactly the same thing as aid. What harbor
adds in this context is not clear. Nonetheless, the task force
decided to repeat the statutory phrase verbatim.98
It should be emphasized that virtually no one
advocates reading entire statutes to jurors. The problem
revolves around what we might call the "critical terms" of the
statute-the words that constitute the essence of an offense
and whose meaning is therefore most likely to be the subject of
an appeal. Leaving aside the problem of harbor, the words
conceal and aid are not that terribly unusual, of course. What
is at stake here is the principle that if a common word means
the same thing as a statutory term, and if no one can articulate
a relevant difference in meaning between them, we ought to
' CAL. PEN. CODE § 32 (1935).
TASK FORCE INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 83, at 520.
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use the more ordinary term. This becomes especially important
when dealing with more uncommon statutory words, like
uttering forged instruments.
What makes the issue so difficult is that tracking
significant statutory language is almost certainly the safest
course. Given the supremacy of legislation in our system, it
takes a courageous appellate judge to invalidate an instruction
that follows statutory language, even if the jury had little idea
what it meant.
This dilemma will surface repeatedly in any effort to
draft more understandable jury instructions. On the California
task force we have gone both ways on the question, sometimes
sticking with statutory language and on other occasions
adopting more comprehensible phraseology.
This question is not apt to be resolved without
decisive action by the appellate courts. If our task force's
instructions are adopted and some are then struck down
because an appellate court insists on tracking critical statutory
terms, we will soon be incorporating even more language
verbatim from the Penal Code. Personally, I am optimistic that
the California Supreme Court will view our efforts more
sympathetically. Chief Justice George has been a strong
supporter of more comprehensible jury instructions.9 As long
as the appellate courts realize that legal accuracy and subtle
distinctions are meaningless if jurors do not understand them,
we should soon see more common terminology substituting for
obscure legislative language and plainly written definitions
instead of legalese defined by more legalese.
VI. SYNTACTIC FEATURES
One of the traditional problems with jury instructions
has been the use of long, convoluted sentences. Moreover, they
have often been poorly organized, avoiding transitions and
placing exceptions before general statements of law. In these
areas, I am pleased to say, our task force has had considerable
success. We have generally tried to use shorter sentences that
express one idea at a time in a logical sequence. In light of the
1H, Jean Guccione, Judicial Council Decides to Press Ahead on Jur,
Instructoms, DAILY RECORDER (Sacramento), Sept. 10, 1997, at 4.
1110 [Vol. 66: 4
THE LANGUAGE OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
subject matter, the sentences have also avoided too much
syntactic complexity. And although there is nothing wrong
with an occasional passive construction, we have generally
attempted to use the active voice whenever possible.
Perhaps the best illustration is reasonable doubt.
That concept, as well as the closely related presumption of
innocence, is presently defined as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent
until the contrary is proved, and in a case of reasonable doubt
whether [his/her] guilt is satisfactorily shown, [he/she] is entitled to
a verdict of not guilty. This presumption places upon the People the
burden of proving [him/her] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere
possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs is open
to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case
which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the
evidence, leaves the mind of the jurors in that condition that they
cannot Isay they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the
charge.
Note the impersonal reference to the jurors and the
odd phrase abiding conviction. More importantly, the definition
in the second paragraph begins with a description of what
reasonable doubt is not, rather than describing what it is. Even
the main definition of reasonable doubt in the second sentence
is in the negative ("that they cannot say"). Nowhere does the
instruction affirmatively tell jurors how much proof is needed.
As Lawrence M. Solan has pointed out, defining this concept
negatively, rather than affirmatively, creates a real danger of
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant in certain types of
cases.
101
Not surprisingly, the strange wording of this
instruction is straight from a statute-California Penal Code §
1096. As mentioned earlier, the California legislature adopted
this language from a Massachusetts case dating from 1850.1°2
CALJIC, supra note 6, at 2.90.
101 Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases:
Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105 (1999) (arguing that
traditional definitions of reasonable doubt impermissibly lower the government's
burden in cases where the evidence of guilt is weak).
'G2 Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850); see also TIERSMA,
supra note 78, at 194-96.
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The CALJIC committee was apparently so concerned with
tracking the exact statutory language that it even adopted the
unorthodox semicolon in the first sentence of the second
paragraph (by today's standards, of course, there might be a
comma, or no punctuation at all).
Unfortunately, redrafting this instruction was
complicated by the fact that the legislature not only defined
reasonable doubt in the code, but it provided that a trial court
"may read" this code section to the jury and need not give any
further instruction on the subject."3 While this provision does
not necessarily require verbatim copying of the legislative
language, it does suggest caution.
The proposed instruction drafted by our task force
addresses this problem by preserving the "critical" language,
while shuffling the words around to improve organization and
syntax:
1. I will now explain the presumption of innocence, the
prosecutor's burden of proof, and the charges against the defendant.
The defendant in this case is charged with - [insert
charge[s]] and has pleaded not guilty. The fact that a criminal
charge has been filed against the defendant is not evidence that the
charge is true. You must not be biased against the defendant just
because (he/she) has been arrested and charged with a crime.
2. A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be
innocent. This presumption requires that the prosecutor prove each
element of the crime[s] [and special allegation[s]] beyond a
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that
leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The
evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in
life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.
3. In deciding whether the prosecution has proven its case
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and
consider all the evidence. Unless the evidence proves the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (he/she) is entitled to an acquittal
and you must find (him/her) not guilty.
Especially in paragraph two, notice that the critical
terminology contained in the instruction has been maintained,
while overall organization and grammar have been greatly
improved.
'' CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096a (1995).
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Another syntactic feature that makes language
harder to understand is the common tendency of legal writers
to use nominalizations in place of the verbs or adjectives from
which they are derived.1 For instance, destruction and
consideration are the nominalized forms of the verbs destroy
and consider. Likewise, ability is the noun form of the adjective
able, and is related semantically to the verb can. Jury
instructions tend to use a great deal of such nominalized forms,
rather than the more basic verbs and adjectives. Instead of
asking whether you can see a particular thing, legal writers
habitually prefer expressions like are you able to see or what is
your ability to see the object in question.
This syntactic feature is an issue with an instruction
on the credibility of witnesses. The existing CALJIC
instruction advises jurors that they should consider a list of
various factors, which tends to include many nominalizations:
In determining the believability of a witness you may
consider anything that has a tendency to prove or disprove the
truthfulness of the testimony of the witness, including but not
limited to any of the following:
The extent of the opportunity or ability of the witness to see
or hear or otherwise become aware of any matter about which the
witness testified;
The ability of the witness to remember or to communicate
any matter about which the witness testified;
The character and quality of that testimony;
The demeanor and manner of the witness while testifying,
The existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other
motive ....
Nouns and other nominal forms in the above include
extent, opportunity, ability, character, quality, demeanor,
manner, existence, and nonexistence. Compare the proposed
new instruction on the same subject:
In evaluating a witness's testimony, consider the following
questions:
a) How well could the witness see or hear [or otherwise
sense] the things about which the witness testified?
104 TIERSMA, supra note 79 at 77-79.
105 CAIJIC, supra note 6, at 2.20.
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b) How well was the witness able to remember and describe
what happened?
c) What was the witness's behavior while testifying?
d) Did the witness understand the questions and answer
them directly?
e) Did the witness have a reason to lie, such as a bias or
prejudice, a personal relationship with someone involved
in the case, or a personal stake in how the case is
decided?. 6
Even here, the lawyerly tendency to use nominalized
forms proved irresistible with question (c), which would have
been more straightforward if it simply asked: How did the
witness behave while testifying?. Overall, however, the
proposed instruction is-at least from a linguistic point of
view-much better than that presently in use.
VII. FEAR OF SLANTING
This is an appropriate place to mention another factor
that may impede comprehensibility: fear of slanting. Those
who draft instructions are understandably quite concerned
that they not favor one side or the other. This is clearly
essential, but sometimes fear of slanting can, in my view,
become excessive and undermine efforts to make the language
as helpful and understandable as possible. For example, some
members of our task force initially favored asking jurors about
the ability of the witness to see the things about which the
witness testified because asking how well the witness could see
might subtly suggest that the witness could see well. Space
prevents us from considering in detail why this is not so; it
should suffice for present purposes to point out that asking
how old a young child is does not suggest that the child is old.
It could be asked about a newborn baby, in fact.
Jury instructions are most effective when they not
only provide jurors with relevant information, but also tell
them what to do with it. Note that even the new, improved
version of the credibility instruction quoted above informs
jurors that they should consider how well a witness could see
the events in question, for instance, but does not tell them that
10 TASK FORCE INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 83, at 60.
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a witness who had a better view of what transpired is more
credible than one who did not. This point may seem self-
evident, but it is not always so. The instruction on credibility
also tells jurors to consider the witness' behavior while
testifying, but gives no clues as to what type of behavior might
be relevant, or what that behavior means in terms of
believability. Similarly, an instruction on eyewitness
identification informs jurors to consider whether the defendant
and the witness are the same or different racially, but fails to
point the way to the conclusion: research has shown that
people are less accurate in identifying people of different
races.' Non*etheless, our task force has consistently refused-
because of fear of slanting-to inform jurors how the factors
presented to them should be applied, beyond the vague
suggestion that jurors should "consider" them.
The issue of slanting or argumentativeness has also
arisen in deciding how to refer to the parties in a criminal case.
What, for example, do you call the prosecutor? One possibility
is simply the district attorney, but this term is not always
applicable because on rare occasion the prosecutor in
California may be an assistant attorney general. Prosecutors
like to refer to themselves as the People (with a capital P), but
this is not particularly plain and might suggest that the
defendant is opposed by all the people of the State of
California, including his mother. More accurate, perhaps, is the
government, a term used by some federal courts. This word,
however, has associations that some prosecutors would rather
avoid.
Our task force decided on prosecutor as the most
neutral term. During the public comment period, however, the
People (i.e., the prosecutors) made it clear that they were not
thrilled by that decision, perhaps because of the phonetic
similarity to persecutors. Apparently, no decision will satisfy
everyone.
What about the defendant? One option is to leave a
blank line so that the judge can fill in his or her name. That
was the choice made by the subcommittee drafting civil
instructions.' 8 This alternative did not prove too popular on
1o* ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EyEWITNEss TESTIMONY 189-90 (1979).
"S JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, TASK FORCE ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
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the criminal task force, however, perhaps because judges did
not relish having to fill in blanks again and again.0 9 Another
option is to refer to the defendant. This avoids the problem of
repeatedly having to fill in blanks, but some people felt that
the term defendant subtly suggests that the person on trial
might actually be guilty. Other rejected proposals were the
actor or the individual. The final possibility comes straight out
of the code-a person. The term person can theoretically refer
to anyone, which is why it works well in the Penal Code, which
is applicable to anyone and everyone. It does not work well in a
jury instruction, however, because the question at trial is not
whether any person committed some crime, but, whether the
defendant did it. If that is what the jury must decide, why not
tell them so directly?
The other problem with person is that, as noted, it can
refer to anyone. This can be problematic because there are
usually at least two people involved in a crime: the defendant
and the victim. Tracking statutory language, the word person
would refer to both persons involved, the distinction being that
the defendant is typically a or the person, whereas the victim is
mostly referred to as another person. Thus, an instruction
might require the jury to decide whether a person (defendant)
injured another person (victim), that the person (defendant)
intended to harm the other person (victim), and that the other
person (victim) suffered great bodily injury.
This sublime distinction might work for crimes
involving only two people but soon runs into trouble when a
third or fourth person enters the scene. Suppose that the
defendant is accused of committing rape by threatening to
injure the victim's daughter. In such an event, the jury would
have to be instructed to decide whether a person (defendant)
had sexual intercourse with another person (victim) and that
the other person (victim) only consented because the person
(defendant) threatened still another person, or perhaps a third
person (daughter). Task force members eventually realized,
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS p. iii (circulated for public comment, May 2000), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/invitationstocommentlaproposals.htm" (last visited Oct. 9,
2001).
1o Although this problem could easily be solved by using computer-generated
instructions, apparently many judges are not very computer literate, so this option was
also rejected.
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though not without much debate, that person would not work.
We thus refer to the defendant as the defendant. On the other
hand, calling someone a victim is still considered problematic;
the victim is generally called another person.
VIII. TEMPLATES
How to name the parties was part of a larger issue:
what template should we use in presenting the elements of the
various crimes? This was an important question because there
are a large number of crimes to be described, and the template
therefore has an impact on dozens of instructions. The existing
CALJIC instructions begin by quoting the Penal Code section
verbatim. What follows is an illustration of how the instruction
then continues, based on the crime of arson of an inhabited
structure. For ease of presentation, it has been simplified by
leaving out definitions and alternative possibilities:
In order to prove this crime, each of the following elements must be
proved:
1. A person set fire to a structure; and
2. The fire was set willfully and maliciously; and
3. The fire caused an inhabited structure to burn.110
A major problem with this template is that it is quite
abstract and does not directly tell the jury what it must decide.
By using a passive verb in the introductory clause ("the
following elements must be proved"), it fails to identify who
must prove the elements (i.e., the prosecutor, or the People).
Moreover, as discussed above, the first element refers to a
person. The reference is actually to the defendant, so why not
just say so? The jury does not decide whether "a person" set a
fire, but whether the defendant did it! Moreover, element two
contains an unnecessary passive construction (was set)-why
not just say that the defendant must have willfully (or perhaps
better: intentionally) and maliciously started the fire? That is
the issue, is it not?
"0 CALJIC, supra note 6, at 14.80.
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The template for the proposed new instructions is
substantially more direct, and thus clearer (again, only one
alternative is presented and definitions are omitted):
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with arson that burned an
inhabited structure.
You may find the defendant guilty of this crime only if the
prosecutor has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. The defendant burned a structure.
2B. (He/She) acted willfully and maliciously with the
intent to burn a structure. AND
3. The fire burned an inhabited structure."
This instruction clearly states who must prove the
case, as well as reminding the jury of the burden of proof. It
directly tells the jury what to decide: Did the defendant burn a
structure, did she act willfully and maliciously, and was the
structure inhabited?
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article has been to show that it is
possible to reform the language of jury instructions, although
we should not underestimate the hurdles that must be
overcome. Change is most likely to be instituted by the
committees that are responsible for drafting the instructions,
rather than by judicial opinions in specific cases. As our
experience in California has demonstrated, there are some real
challenges even for committees philosophically united behind
the idea of increasing comprehension, and the process may be
more difficult and time-consuming than one might originally
think. But it can be done. The instructions that we have
released for public comment are significantly more
understandable than those presently being used not only in
California, but in most other jurisdictions.
While appellate courts will probably not be leading
the charge, for all the reasons outlined in this Article, they do
have a crucial supporting role. Any change of this magnitude
... TASK FORCE INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 83, at 1055.
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will invariably lead to legal challenges. One hopes that judges
will recognize the importance of comprehension when
evaluating those challenges.
For hundreds of years, juries have been an essential
part of the Anglo-American criminal justice system. Trial by
jury offers many benefits, not the least of which is inspiring
public confidence in the fairness of the system. At the same
time, having cases decided by people without legal training
potentially undermines the rule of law. If we are serious about
keeping trial by jury, and if we believe in the values of the rule
of law, it is essential that we convey the law to jurors in a way
that they can understand.

